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if and only if both tasks are successful. Yet, if the government has only a
limited budget, it may be optimal to separate the tasks, so that there are two
contractors each in charge of one task. In this case, high eﬀorts in both tasks
can be implemented with smaller bonus payments.
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1 Introduction
An important question in public procurement is whether the government should
bundle diﬀerent tasks together and let one private contractor be responsible for
these tasks, or whether the government should contract with diﬀerent private
parties each in charge of only one task.1 The present paper reconsiders the
bundling decision in a model where the principal (i.e., the government) has
only a limited budget. In an influential paper, Hart (2003) has argued that fi-
nancing issues may be secondary in the context of public-private partnerships,
since the government has “enormous powers of taxation” (Hart, 2003, p. C75).
Yet, in times of financial crises, governments may well face binding budget
constraints. The purpose of the present study is to explore the implications of
such constraints on the optimal bundling decision.2
In the principal-agent literature, many authors have studied moral hazard
problems in which the agent is risk-neutral but wealth-constrained, such that
a “limited liability rent” must be paid to motivate an agent to exert high
eﬀort (see Laﬀont and Martimort, 2002). In most papers, only the agent is
wealth-contrained, while the principal faces no (binding) wealth constraints.3
When in such a framework two technologically independent tasks have to be
1For discussions of bundling in public procurement, see e.g. Hart (2003), Bennett and
Iossa (2006), Chen and Chiu (2010), Iossa and Martimort (2012), and De Brux and Desrieux
(2013).
2In a model encompassing agency problems and property rights, Martimort and Pouyet
(2008) find that the question whether tasks are bundled may be more important than the
ownership structure. For discussions of public versus private ownership in incomplete con-
tracting frameworks, see Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and Hoppe and Schmitz (2010).
3See Innes (1990) for an exception. Yet, Innes (1990) does not analyze bundling of tasks.
2
performed, bundling these tasks may reduce the limited liability rent that the
principal has to pay in order to induce high eﬀorts. If one agent is in charge of
both tasks, the principal must pay a bonus only if both tasks are successful.
In contrast, if two diﬀerent agents are each in charge of one task, then the
principal must also pay a bonus if only one agent is successful.4
Yet, if the principal has only a limited budget which she can use for making
payments to the agent(s), then she may be better oﬀ when she does not bundle
the tasks. The intuition for this novel finding is as follows. If one agent is in
charge of both tasks, the payment that the principal has to make if both tasks
are successful may be so large that the principal cannot aﬀord to induce the
agent to exert high eﬀorts in both tasks. In contrast, if there are two agents
each in charge of one task, the principal can induce both agents to exert high
eﬀorts, since now the payments can be smaller, as they are also paid when
only one task is successful.
2 The model
Consider a principal (a government agency) who wants two tasks to be per-
formed in order to improve the provision of public goods. In each task i ∈
{1, 2}, unobservable eﬀort ei ∈ {el, eh} can be exerted, where 0 < el < 12 <
eh < 1. Eﬀort in task i leads to a success (yi = 1) with probability ei and to
a failure (yi = 0) otherwise. A success in task i yields a non-monetary benefit
b to the principal, capturing the improved quality of public good provision.
4See e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, section 6.2.2), when their parameter γ is zero.
For experimental evidence, see the “no conflict” treatments in Hoppe and Kusterer (2011).
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A failure yields no benefit to the principal. The outcome yi of each task is
verifiable.
The principal can either decide to have one agent in charge of both tasks
(bundling), or to have two diﬀerent agents in charge of the two diﬀerent tasks
(separation). An agent’s eﬀort costs in a task i are given by ψ > 0 if high
eﬀort is chosen and by 0 if low eﬀort is chosen. Note that the two tasks
are technologically unrelated. All parties are risk-neutral and the reservation
utilities are given by zero. Moreover, we assume that the agents have no
wealth and are protected by limited liability; i.e., payments to the agents must
be non-negative.
If the principal decides to bundle the tasks, then a contract is given by
(w11, w10, w01, w00), where wy1y2 denotes the payment from the principal to the
agent given the outcomes y1 of task 1 and y2 of task 2. Analogously, if the
principal hires agent A to perform task 1 and agent B to perform task 2, the
contracts are given by (wA11, wA10, wA01, wA00) for agent A and (wB11, wB10, wB01, wB00)
for agent B.
Finally, our key assumption is that also the principal has limited resources.
This assumption distinguishes the present paper from previous studies on pub-
lic procurement contracting with limited liability.5 Specifically, the payment
to the agent in case of bundling and the sum of the payments that the prin-
cipal makes to the agents in case of separation must not be larger than the
principal’s budget W .
Throughout, we suppose that the principal’s benefit b is suﬃciently large to
make high eﬀort attractive for the principal to implement even in a second-best
5See e.g. Martimort and Straub (2012) and Hoppe and Schmitz (2013).
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world in which eﬀort in unobservable.6
Assumption 1. b > ehψ/(eh − el)2.
3 Bundling
Let us first suppose the principal contracts with only one agent to perform
both tasks. The agent’s expected payoﬀ when he exerts high eﬀort in both
tasks is given by
uhh = e2hw11 + eh(1− eh)(w10 + w01) + (1− eh)2w00 − 2ψ.
When the agent exerts high eﬀort in task 1 and low eﬀort in task 2, his expected
payoﬀ is
uhl = ehelw11 + eh(1− el)w10 + (1− eh)elw01 + (1− eh)(1− el)w00 − ψ.
Analogously, when the agent chooses low eﬀort in task 1 and high eﬀort in
task 2, his expected payoﬀ is
ulh = elehw11 + (1− el)ehw01 + el(1− eh)w10 + (1− el)(1− eh)w00 − ψ.
Finally, when the agent chooses low eﬀort in both tasks, his expected payoﬀ
is given by
ull = e2lw11 + el(1− el)(w10 + w01) + (1− el)2w00.
6The expected total surplus is 2(ehb−ψ) if high eﬀort is exerted in both tasks, (eh+el)b−ψ
if high eﬀort is exerted in only one task, and 2elb if low eﬀort is exerted in both tasks. Thus,
in a first-best world, high eﬀort in both tasks would be chosen whenever b ≥ ψ/(eh − el),
while low eﬀort in both tasks would be chosen otherwise. Yet, it will become clear in Section
4 that in the second-best world under separation the principal would never implement high
eﬀort if b < ehψ/(eh−el)2. Hence, if Assumption 1 is violated, separation cannot be strictly
better than bundling.
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High eﬀort in both tasks can be implemented if it is possible to simulta-
neously satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints uhh ≥ uhl, uhh ≥ ulh,
uhh ≥ ull and the constraints that the payments must be non-negative and
smaller than the budget W .7 The principal’s expected payoﬀ when high eﬀort
in both tasks is implemented is given by
2ehb− e2hw11 − eh(1− eh)(w10 + w01)− (1− eh)2w00.
It is straightforward to see that it is optimal for the principal to set w00 = 0
and w10 = w01 =: w1. The incentive compatibility constraints uhh ≥ uhl and
uhh ≥ ulh can thus be written as
w11 ≥ CI(w1) :=
ψ
eh(eh − el)
+
2eh − 1
eh
w1
and the incentive compatibility constraint uhh ≥ ull can be written as
w11 ≥ CII(w1) :=
2ψ
e2h − e2l
− 21− eh − el
eh + el
w1.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the two tasks are bundled and the principal wants to
implement high eﬀort in both tasks.
(i) Suppose that eh+el ≥ 1. The principal can implement high eﬀort in both
tasks whenever W ≥ 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ). In this case, she sets w11 = 2ψ/(e2h − e2l )
and w1 = 0, yielding the expected payoﬀ 2ehb− 2ψe2h/(e2h − e2l ).
(ii) Suppose that eh + el < 1. The principal can implement high eﬀort in
both tasks whenever W ≥ 2ψ/(eh − el). If W ≥ 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ), the principal
sets w11 = 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ) and w1 = 0, yielding the expected payoﬀ 2ehb −
2ψe2h/(e
2
h − e2l ). If 2ψ/(eh − el) ≤ W < 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ), the principal sets
7Throughout, participation constraints are redundant, as they are implied by incentive
compatibility and non-negativity of the payments.
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w11 =W and w1 =
2ψ−(e2h−e2l )W
2(1−eh−el)(eh−el) , yielding the expected payoﬀ 2ehb− e
2
hW −
eh(1− eh) 2ψ−(e
2
h−e2l )W
(1−eh−el)(eh−el) .
Proof. The principal’s problem is to maximize 2ehb− e2hw11 − 2eh(1− eh)w1
subject to the constraints w11 ≥ CI(w1), w11 ≥ CII(w1), 0 ≤ w11 ≤ W , and
0 ≤ w1 ≤W .
Consider case (i). Note that CII(w1) is increasing. Hence, the constraints
w11 ≥ CII(w1) and w11 ≤ W cannot be simultaneously satisfied if W <
2ψ/(e2h − e2l ), so under this condition it is impossible to implement high eﬀort
in both tasks. SupposeW ≥ 2ψ/(e2h−e2l ). Ignore for a moment the constraint
w11 ≥ CI(w1). Then the constraints w11 ≥ CII(w1) and w1 ≥ 0 must be
binding, since otherwise the principal’s expected payoﬀ could be increased by
reducing w11 (resp., w1), which would not violate the remaining constraints.
Thus, the solution to the principal’s relaxed problem is w11 = 2ψ/(e2h − e2l )
and w1 = 0. It is easy to see that this solution also satisfies the omitted con-
straint w11 ≥ CI(w1), so we have found the solution to the principal’s original
maximization problem.
Consider now case (ii). Note that CII(w1) is decreasing, CI(w1) is increas-
ing, and CII(0) > CI(0). Moreover, if w1 = ψ/(eh − el), then CI(w1) =
CII(w1) = 2ψ/(eh − el). Hence, it is impossible to simultaneously satisfy the
constraints w11 ≥ CI(w1), w11 ≥ CII(w1), and w11 ≤ W if W < 2ψ/(eh −
el). Suppose that W ≥ CII(0) = 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ). Ignore for a moment the
constraints w11 ≥ CI(w1), 0 ≤ w11 ≤ W , and w1 ≤ W . The constraint
w11 ≥ CII(w1) must be binding, since otherwise the principal’s expected pay-
oﬀ could be increased by reducing w11. The principal’s problem is then to
maximize 2ehb − e2h( 2ψe2h−e2l − 2
1−eh−el
eh+el
w1) − 2eh(1 − eh)w1 subject to w1 ≥ 0,
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which is solved by w1 = 0. It is straightforward to check that the solution
w1 = 0, w11 = 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ) satisfies the omitted constraints. Next, sup-
pose that 2ψ/(eh − el) ≤ W < 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ). Ignore for a moment the
constraints w11 ≥ CI(w1), 0 ≤ w11, and 0 ≤ w1 ≤ W . The constraint
w11 ≥ CII(w1) must again be binding. The principal’s problem is to maxi-
mize 2ehb− e2h( 2ψe2h−e2l − 2
1−eh−el
eh+el
w1)− 2eh(1− eh)w1 subject to w11 ≤W . The
principal thus makes w1 as small as possible given that w11 = CII(w1) ≤ W
must hold. The solution is given by w11 = W , w1 =
2ψ−(e2h−e2l )W
2(1−eh−el)(eh−el) , which
also satisfies the omitted constraints. ¥
Of course, the principal can always implement low eﬀort in both tasks by
setting all wages equal to zero, so her expected payoﬀ is 2elb. Moreover, the
principal may want to implement high eﬀort in only one task, say task 1. Then
she maximizes
(eh + el)b− ehelw11 − eh(1− el)w10 − (1− eh)elw01 − (1− eh)(1− el)w00
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints uhl ≥ uhh, uhl ≥ ulh, uhl ≥
ull as well as the constraints that the payments must be non-negative and
smaller than the budget W . Ignore for a moment the constraints uhl ≥ uhh
and uhl ≥ ulh. The principal then maximizes her expected payoﬀ subject to
el(w11 − w01) + (1 − el)(w10 − w00) ≥ ψ/(eh − el) and the constraints on the
payments. Hence, she sets w00 = w01 = 0. The principal can implement high
eﬀort in one task and low eﬀort in the other task whenever W ≥ ψ/(eh − el).
In this case, it is optimal for her to set w11 = w10 = ψ/(eh − el). It is easy to
check that the omitted constraints are also satisfied. The principal’s expected
payoﬀ then is (eh + el)b− ehψ/(eh − el).
Note that the principal’s expected payoﬀ when she implements high eﬀort
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in only one task is strictly larger then her expected payoﬀ when she imple-
ments low eﬀort in both tasks if and only if b > ehψ/(eh − el)2, which holds
according to Assumption 1. Thus, the principal implements low eﬀort in both
tasks only if W < ψ/(eh − el). Moreover, under Assumption 1 the principal’s
expected payoﬀ when she implements high eﬀort in both tasks is larger than
when she implements high eﬀort in only one task. Hence, the principal always
implements high eﬀort in as many tasks as possible, so that the maximum
expected payoﬀs that the principal can attain under bundling are as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose the two tasks are bundled.
(i) Suppose that eh + el ≥ 1. The principal’s maximum expected payoﬀ is
Πbundle =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2ehb− 2ψe
2
h
e2h−e2l
if 2ψe2h−e2l
≤W,
(eh + el)b− ehψeh−el if
ψ
eh−el ≤W <
2ψ
e2h−e2l
,
2elb if W < ψeh−el .
(ii) Suppose that eh + el < 1. The principal’s maximum expected payoﬀ is
Πbundle =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2ehb− 2ψe
2
h
e2h−e2l
if 2ψe2h−e2l
≤W,
2ehb− e2hW − eh(1− eh)
2ψ−(e2h−e2l )W
(1−eh−el)(eh−el) if
2ψ
eh−el ≤W <
2ψ
e2h−e2l
,
(eh + el)b− ehψeh−el if
ψ
eh−el ≤W <
2ψ
eh−el ,
2elb if W < ψeh−el .
4 Separation
Let us now consider the case of separation, such that agent A is in charge of
task 1 while another agent B is in charge of task 2.
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Suppose first the principal wants to implement high eﬀort in both tasks.
She maximizes her expected payoﬀ
2ehb− e2h(wA11+wB11)− eh(1− eh)(wA10+wB10+wA01+wB01)− (1− eh)2(wA00+wB00)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
e2hw
A
11 + eh(1− eh)(wA10 + wA01) + (1− eh)2wA00 − ψ
≥ elehwA11 + el(1− eh)wA10 + (1− el)ehwA01 + (1− el)(1− eh)wA00,
e2hw
B
11 + eh(1− eh)(wB10 + wB01) + (1− eh)2wB00 − ψ
≥ ehelwB11 + eh(1− el)wB10 + (1− eh)elwB01 + (1− eh)(1− el)wB00,
and the constraints on the payments, wAy1y2 ≥ 0, wBy1y2 ≥ 0, and wAy1y2+wBy1y2 ≤
W , for y1 ∈ {0, 1}, y2 ∈ {0, 1}. It is easy to verify that in a solution wA00 =
wA01 = wB00 = wB10 = 0 and ehwA11+(1−eh)wA10 = ehwB11+(1−eh)wB01 = ψ/(eh−el)
must hold. Hence, the principal’s expected payoﬀ from implementing high
eﬀort in both tasks is 2eh(b−ψ/(eh− el)). Note that high eﬀort in both tasks
is implementable whenever W ≥ 2ψ/[(2− eh)(eh− el)], since the principal can
set wA11 = wB11 = ψ/[(2− eh)(eh − el)] and wA10 = wB01 = 2ψ/[(2− eh)(eh − el)].
Suppose now the principal implements high eﬀort in only one task, say task
1. It is straightforward to see that she will make no payments to agent B. The
incentive compatibility constraint of agent A reads
ehelwA11 + eh(1− el)wA10 + (1− eh)elwA01 + (1− eh)(1− el)wA00 − ψ
≥ e2lwA11 + el(1− el)(wA10 + wA01) + (1− el)2wA00.
Thus, it is optimal for the principal to set wA00 = wA01 = 0 and wA11 = wA10 =
ψ/(eh− el). The principal’s expected payoﬀ then is (eh+ el)b− ehψ/(eh− el).
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Note that high eﬀort in only one task is implementable wheneverW ≥ ψ/(eh−
el).
Finally, the principal can always implement low eﬀort in both tasks by
setting all payments to zero. Her expected payoﬀ then is 2elb. The principal’s
expected payoﬀ when she implements high eﬀort in only one task is strictly
larger than when she implements low eﬀort in both tasks if and only if b >
ehψ/(eh− el)2, which is satisfied according to Assumption 1. Moreover, under
Assumption 1 the principal’s expected payoﬀ when she implements high eﬀort
in both tasks is larger than when she implements high eﬀort in only one task.
Hence, the following result holds.
Proposition 2 Suppose the two tasks are separated. The principal’s maxi-
mum expected payoﬀ is
Πsep =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2eh(b− ψeh−el ) if
2ψ
(2−eh)(eh−el) ≤W,
(eh + el)b− ehψeh−el if
ψ
eh−el ≤W <
2ψ
(2−eh)(eh−el) ,
2elb if W < ψeh−el .
5 Bundling versus separation
We can now state our main result, which follows immediately from a compar-
ison of the principal’s expected payoﬀs as characterized in Propositions 1 and
2.
Proposition 3 (i) Suppose that eh + el ≥ 1. If W > 2ψ/(e2h − e2l ), then the
principal strictly prefers bundling. If 2ψ/[(2 − eh)(eh − el)] < W < 2ψ/(e2h −
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e2l ), then the principal strictly prefers separation. Otherwise, the principal is
indiﬀerent between the two modes.
(ii) Suppose that eh + el < 1. If W > 2ψ/(eh − el), then the principal
strictly prefers bundling. If 2ψ/[(2 − eh)(eh − el)] < W < 2ψ/(eh − el), then
the principal strictly prefers separation. Otherwise, the principal is indiﬀerent
between the two modes.
Hence, if the principal does not face a relevant budget constraint (i.e., ifW
is suﬃciently large), it is optimal for her to bundle the two tasks. This result is
in line with the existing literature on multi-task moral hazard problems with
wealth-constrained agents. However, when the principal has only a limited
budget, a new eﬀect arises. Separation can now be optimal, because it may
allow the principal to implement high eﬀorts in both tasks even when in the
case of bundling she could implement high eﬀort in one task only.8
Intuitively, in the case of bundling, the principal must make a very large
payment to the agent when both tasks are successful. In contrast, under sepa-
ration the payments can be smaller, since each agent can also be incentivized
with a payment that is made if the other agent is not successful, so that the
payments can be spread more evenly over the diﬀerent states of the world.
6 Conclusion
We have considered a government agency that wants two tasks to be performed.
In each task, unobservable eﬀort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private
8Note that budget levels W such that separation is strictly optimal always exist in case
(ii), while they exist in case (i) whenever el < 2(1− eh).
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party. In line with the principal-agent literature, if the government faces no
binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. In this case,
the contractor responsible for both tasks gets a large payment whenever both
tasks are successful. However, we have shown that if the government has only
a limited budget, then it may be optimal to separate the two tasks, so that
there are two diﬀerent contractors, each responsible for one task only. High
eﬀorts in both tasks can then be implemented with smaller payments, since
each contractor can also be incentivized with a payment that is made when
the other contractor is not successful.
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